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A difficult copyright environment, combined with the Chinese government’s 
continuing power over key distribution and promotion channels, including 
radio, television, publishing and concerts (Baranovitch, 2003; Brady, 2006), 
have been key factors in the failure of international labels to secure a dominant 
position in China’s rapidly developing domestic music market. This paper 
argues that while international record labels have been paralyzed by concepts 
of value that depend on an ability to control the copying of music products and 
to enforce intellectual property rights (Montgomery & Potts, 2008), domestic 
music and entertainment businesses are actively exploring strategies that allow 
them to function in a weak copyright environment. Cultural policies ostensibly 
intended to prevent the circulation of heterodox content are having an 
important side-effect: making it more attractive for music-related businesses to 
promote and distribute local content. As a result, domestic music and 
entertainment businesses are developing a distinct advantage in the highly 
competitive Chinese market.  
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Introduction 
In 2006, CEO of the International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI), John 
Kennedy, addressed the International Forum on the audio-visual industry in Shanghai, 
stating: 
Illegal sales of music in China are valued by [the] IFPI at around US$400 
million, with around 90 percent of all recordings being illegal. No creative or 
knowledge-based industry can hope to survive in such an environment 
(Kennedy, 2006). 
 Recording Industry lobbies such as the IFPI and the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) have been engaged in high-profile campaigns against 
copyright infringement in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the early 1990s 
(Wang, 2003).  It would be a truism to state that the intellectual property businesses 
that these groups represent have been frustrated by their inability to function 
effectively in the face of China’s weak copyright environment.   
 In spite of John Kennedy’s lament that high rates of unauthorized copying and 
distribution make it impossible for businesses to survive, some creative and 
knowledge-based businesses are making money in China. While John Kennedy and 
the IFPI were earnestly calling on China’s authorities to increase levels of 
enforcement in order to make it possible for a commercially focused music industry to 
develop, in 2006 the Chairman of the Chinese Audio-Visual Society declared that the 
nation had “leapfrogged into an age of digital music”, noting that digital distribution 
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was outperforming traditional record sales, generating profits of 3.6 billion yuan in 
2005, compared to just 2.7 billion yuan in the “best year” of physical music sales in 
China (Sun, 2006).  Sales of mobile phone music are quickly becoming the most 
significant source of music-related revenue (Yao, 2007), and the cross-platform 
promotion of China’s Supergirl series generated massive profits for the show’s 
developers and mobile partners (Keane, 2007, p. 122). 
 Drawing on preliminary interviews with members of the music industry in 
Beijing between 2005 and 2007, this paper discusses the ways in which China’s music 
industry is adapting to the technological and political environment within which it 
must function. Section one briefly discusses key differences between the conditions 
that allowed an organized recording industry to develop in the West,1 and those within 
which China’s commercial music industry is evolving. Section two of the paper 
explores the impact of cultural policies ostensibly intended to restrict the circulation 
of heterodox content on commercially focused production and exploitation of music. 
Although unauthorized content can be obtained with relative ease, censorship policies 
are providing Chinese content with significant advantages. Finally, the paper 
examines the role of mobile distribution channels as a growing site of music-related 
investment and income.  
 Threats to the dominant position of record labels and the use of new 
technologies and business models to connect fans with music are not unique to China 
(Hunt, 2007; Fine, 2007). This paper argues that China provides a valuable case study 
for researchers interested in the relationship between copyright and the growth of 
creative industries because, to a large extent, music-related business models in China 
are evolving in an environment where copying and distribution are difficult to control 
and very high levels of music “piracy” are the norm.2 Examining how and why 
commercial activities centred around the production, distribution and consumption of 
music are developing in the context of weak copyright and rapid adoption of new 
technology may provide important clues for researchers and policy-makers attempting 
to understand how music industries adapt to changing regulatory and technological 
environments.   
 
Background: A brief history of China’s music industry. 
By the late 1960s music had become big business in the United States, bringing much 
higher rates of investment return than other areas of the entertainment industry 
(Lipsitz, 1994). Pop stars, rock concerts, music festivals, commercial radio, music 
charts and, of course, record labels had become part of the social and economic fabric 
of the “Western” world (Gronow, Saunio & Moseley 1999, p. 135). Copyright and 
contract law, legal technologies that the recorded music industry relies heavily upon, 
were well established. Increasing affluence and innovations in physical technology, 
such as transistor radios and vinyl records, made the consumption of music more 
affordable than ever before. These technological developments combined with the 
growing affluence of post-war populations, an emerging consumer culture and a 
particular legal environment to create the conditions in which specific kinds of music 
businesses were able to flourish (Laing, 2002). 
 In contrast, none of these conditions were present in the People’s Republic of 
China at that time. The PRC, which formally came into existence in 1949, was caught 
in the midst of a radical communist experiment. The country was still desperately 
poor – more than thirty million people died during the famines following the Great 
Leap Forward in 1958, and in 1979 one in three peasants were reported to be living on 
the verge of starvation (Becker, 2000, p. 24). While the United States and Western 
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Europe operated as market-driven economies, China’s economy was centrally planned 
(Ikels, 1996, p. 3; Becker, 2000, pp. 297-8). During the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 
1976) the state become even more closely involved in commissioning and producing 
cultural and entertainment products, which were seen as important pedagogic and 
propagandistic tools for the state (Kraus, 2004). By the time the post-Mao leadership 
began loosening restrictions on trade and interaction with the outside world in the 
early 1980s, the music industry that did exist in the PRC, including the live, recorded 
and broadcast sectors, was dominated by state funded cultural troupes dedicated to 
writing and performing a limited repertoire of propaganda songs (Kraus, 2004, p. 9).  
 Although liberal market reforms and gradual loosening of state control over 
entertainment progressed throughout the 1980s, the formal legal system had been 
deliberately dismantled during the Cultural Revolution (Chen, 1999, p. 40). As Alford 
(1995) discusses, China possessed no indigenous equivalent to concepts of 
“intellectual property”.  Notions of individual creativity and ownership of ideas were 
not easily reconciled with Confucian concepts of creativity, knowledge and learning 
(Alford, 1995, p. 9). For these and various other reasons, the PRC remained without a 
copyright law until 1990 (Qu, 2002; Mertha, 2005).3 At the same time, economic 
reforms were giving individuals growing levels of disposable income and new choices 
about how it could be spent. Technologies that made copying, distributing and 
listening to music affordable on a mass scale combined with increased contact with 
the outside world to ensure greater access to foreign entertainment and cultural 
products for most of the population (Brace, 1991, p. 45). However, censorship 
policies continued to heavily restrict cultural production and legitimate distribution 
(Brady, 2006).  
 The creation of “neighbouring rights” in the early twentieth Century made it 
possible for recording businesses to own the copyright in sound recording they had 
commissioned (Laing, 2002, p. 185).  This development resulted in commercial 
opportunities for record labels: businesses willing to invest in the production and 
promotion of music that could be sold to a mass market. Because access to the 
equipment and expertise required to record music was limited, it was generally 
possible for increasingly organized recording industry to monitor and control the 
production and distribution of music ‘products’ – physical copies of sound recordings 
(Gronow et. al., 1999). The business models that dominated the global recorded music 
industry in the second half of the twentieth century were based around record labels 
providing artists with access to recording equipment, mass production and distribution 
channels, marketing and promotion services, and remunerating them on a royalty 
basis.   
 Legally enforceable intellectual property rights and physical technologies that 
made controlled mass production and distribution of music possible (Bettig, 1996) 
were key factors in the rise of a handful of highly integrated, transnational music 
corporations that accounted for 90 percent of gross sales of recorded music in 1994 
(Burnett, 1994, p. 2). Although developments in physical technology, such as cassette 
tapes and recorders, presented challenges to the industry’s ability to control copying, 
these changes occurred after markets, industry structures, professional organizations 
and group collection infrastructures had become established. As a result, the industry 
was generally able to respond in a systematic way and incremental developments in 
analogue technologies of copying did little to disrupt its overall structure (Frith, 2004). 
 In China, on the other hand, technologies for mass reproduction and 
consumption of recorded music became available in the absence of copyright law, an 
organized domestic music industry, or clear legitimate channels for the distribution of 
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most foreign content. These technologies also became available as China was 
transitioning from a planned economy to a market system. High levels of demand for 
popular music, combined with readily available technologies for mass reproduction 
and consumption and an absence of legitimate distribution channels contributed 
significantly to the rise of a black market in music products and highly sophisticated 
illegal distribution networks (de Kloet, 2002). The Internet, personal computers and 
cheap MP3 players: technologies that are challenging approaches to the control and 
monetization of content globally have compounded the difficulties associated with 
controlling distribution. Although there are some signs that the strategies of major 
international labels to online distribution in China may be changing, albeit slowly,4 
the vast majority of music downloaded from the Internet onto personal computers or 
portable devices such as MP3 players currently occurs without permission from or 
payment to copyright owners (Daniel, 2007; Music2.0, 2008; International Federation 
of Phonographic Industries, 2008).  
 Not only are new technologies being adopted with enormous speed across the 
country, they are being embraced fastest by groups traditionally considered most 
likely to pay for music in other markets. Young, educated city-dwellers with relatively 
high disposable incomes are now the group most likely to have access to broadband 
connections, cheap MP3 players and next-generation mobile devices (China Internet 
Network Information Centre, 2008).  According to Kaiser Kuo, a founding member of 
the rock band Tang Dynasty and current director of digital strategy for advertising 
group Ogilvy:  
…So many of [the] people who are interested in music are also Internet 
users. If you look at 20-24 year olds alone in China, the penetration of 
Internet usage is over 40 percent. It’s about 43.4 percent according to the last 
survey. And in urban areas, if you were to leave out rural China, I’m sure 
that it is upwards of 70 percent. It’s enormous. So all these people, the 
young urbanites in China are all Internet users and everybody knows where 
to go to download music. It’s no mystery at all. There’s no reason to go and 
buy any of it. So [record labels] have gone from the frying pan into the fire. 
They hadn’t even put a dent in pirate physical copies before P2P and MP3 
downloading came along (K. Kuo, personal communication, 31 October, 
2007). 
 
Cultural policies 
Commercial cultural and entertainment industries are a relatively new development in 
the PRC. Although content restrictions are being eased and commercial spaces are 
expanding, government approval is still required for the sale of music. Baranovitch 
(2003) argues that new technologies and a changing media environment have not 
necessarily diminished the state’s interest in popular culture as a tool of propaganda. 
Rather, the Chinese government is adapting strategies of influence and control to 
function in an increasingly market-driven environment. By maintaining control over 
access to commercial opportunities, through control of the broadcast media, 
regulations requiring permits for large-scale concerts and the need to obtain 
publishing licenses for legal sales of music, the Chinese government has been able to 
limit the commercial viability of artists it does not explicitly endorse (Baranovitch, 
2003, p.271). Continued control over broadcast and print media also allows the 
authorities to prevent access to promotion opportunities for artists, businesses and 
products that offend political, ideological or moral sensitivities. Although it is still 
possible to make, play and listen to unauthorized music, the Chinese government has 
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significantly limited commercial incentives for its organized production and 
distribution. 
 Policies originally intended to control heterodox content have had another 
important impact: creating barriers to the legitimate domestic market for foreign 
content producers, increasing incentives for the production of domestic content and 
reducing competition within the legitimate market for domestic music. In order to 
release an album, artists require a ‘publishing number’ that can only be obtained 
through a licensed publishing company. Foreign companies cannot obtain a 
publishing licence, and so they have no choice but to collaborate with a Chinese 
partner in order to distribute music. While licensed publishing companies are able to 
issue publishing numbers for local artists directly, foreign albums must be vetted and 
formally cleared for release by the Ministry of Culture – a time-consuming process. In 
2005, Huayi Music’s Vice General Manager Daniel Zhao cited this added difficulty as 
a factor in his label’s decision not to release foreign albums: 
It is very hard to release foreign albums in China. In order to get a 
publishing number you have to apply to the Ministry of Culture’s censorship 
committee – song lyrics, album design all have to be approved by the 
censorship committee. It probably takes 2-3 weeks. Then if there is no 
religion, no sex, no bad language, the Ministry of Culture may say OK. 
Sometimes they will say that certain tracks are not suitable to be released, so 
individual tracks have to be removed. That system doesn’t apply to domestic 
albums. Domestic albums just deal with the book number system. Publishing 
companies themselves are able to issue the numbers. That process will only 
take 4-5 days (D. Zhao, personal communication, 9 August, 2005). 
 Beaker Huang, Business Development Manager of Warner Music China 
viewed the music censorship system as a straight forward market protection measure, 
intended to keep foreign artists out while the domestic industry developed (Huang, 
2005).  
 In Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of 
Capitalism, Ha-Joon Chang (2008) argues convincingly that government intervention 
to protect infant industries from international competition has played a key role in the 
rapid economic growth and industrial development of countries that have established 
themselves as economic power-houses. There are signs that a similar process is 
occurring in relation to China’s music industry. Governing structures that came into 
existence to allow the state to maintain ideological control over culture are now 
shielding emerging creative-cultural industries from foreign competition. This is 
providing space within which audiences for home-grown content are being 
established and domestic content production capacity is being increased.  
 
The evolution of a Chinese approach to the music industry? 
The dominance of a few developed nations in global trades in culture has led many to 
question the fairness of expanding global intellectual property system. According to 
UNESCO, developing countries account for less than 1 percent share of exports of 
cultural goods (UNESCO, 2005). It is well documented that developed nations have 
been a driving force in the expansion of copyright in an international context and that 
copyright industry lobbies based within these countries have influenced the 
international protection frameworks (Wang, 2003; Arup, 2000; Miller et al., 2005; 
Consumers International, 2006, p. 4). Critics argue that the global intellectual 
property system does little more than creating a larger market for the export of 
copyrighted content by nations in which these industries are well established. In 
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addition to creating a danger that domestic cultural industries in developing 
economies will be unable to compete with a flood of foreign content, overly 
restrictive copyright laws prevent access to the information and materials that 
developing countries need in order to increase the education and skills of their own 
populations (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002; Consumers International, 2006).  
 In spite of this, foreign hopefuls have been disappointed by their inability to 
capture a greater share of China’s increasingly dynamic domestic music market. 
UNESCO reports that, in 2003, imported music accounted for over 50 percent of 
recorded music sales in China (UNESCO, 2005, p. 39). However, given that even the 
most conservative estimates suggest that “piracy” makes up around 80 percent of 
China’s physical music market (Credit Suisse Equity Research, 2005) this figure must 
be understood in the context of a much larger market, for which reliable statistics are 
difficult to find. Other sources have reported that in 2005 Western artists accounted 
for just 5 percent of music sales, and regional Asian Artists for a further 50 percent 
(Scott, 2005). Industry insiders estimate that international artists still account for less 
than 10 percent of the overall digital revenue of major labels operating in China 
(Daniel, 2007). According to John Kennedy (2008): 
China has potentially the largest online music-buying public in the world with as 
many broadband connections as the United States. Currently, however, more 
than 99 percent of all music files distributed in the country are pirate and 
China’s total legitimate music market, at US$76 million, accounts for less than 1 
percent of global recorded music sales.  
 Why have the experience and accumulated catalogues of major international 
record labels counted for so little in China? Part of the answer appears to be that 
international labels have built their business models around the notion that an artist 
can record music, which can be sold independently of the physical presence of the 
artist in any particular market. Ed Peto (2007), Beijing-based promoter and music 
consultant, observes: 
… While the traditional record label model isn’t exactly going through a 
golden age in the West, it never even had a golden age in the Middle 
Kingdom. 
 While major international labels have been unwilling to invest heavily in the 
promotion of international artists in a market where mass-scale returns are difficult to 
secure, local artists and labels have been actively working to develop business 
strategies capable of generating income in spite of very high levels of piracy. One 
strategy for doing this has been to rely on personal appearances by artists, which 
cannot be replicated. As a result, there is less emphasis on producing popular albums, 
and more emphasis on gaining popularity and profile through single hits that lead to 
lucrative product endorsement and live appearance or performance deals: 
… In foreign countries there is a clear line between publishing deals and record 
deals. But over here you would often find a record label playing all of the 
different roles as a record company, as artist management, as a publisher. They 
sign all round deals with their talent. They do make sure that once they invest in 
one field they recoup it from every form possible (J. Wang, personal 
communication, 2 August, 2005).  
 In contrast to Western markets, where artist management and music are 
generally separate, in China assigning a record label with management rights is 
considered one of the most important aspects of an artist’s contract, forming a vital 
income source for domestic labels: 
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We own both the music rights and the artist’s performance rights. As a result, we 
get a certain percentage of the artist’s performance fee every time they appear in 
public (D. Zhao, personal communication, 9 August, 2005).  
Artists such as the Huayi-signed Yu Quan duo can earn up to 200 million yuan 
(US$25 million) a year in performance fees (D. Zhao, personal communication, 9 August, 
2005). However, even for Chinese labels, relying on personal appearance and advertising 
revenue presents practical problems. Personal appearances have limited scalability. Neither 
advertising nor personal appearance fit well with the ‘long tail’ approach, which, in other 
markets, allows back-catalogues to continue generating revenue for labels and artists long 
after the artist has been eclipsed by the latest trend. 
 It is difficult for international labels to capitalize on the established reputations of 
foreign artists by mimicking these practices in China.  As with music sales, concerts by 
foreign artists are made more difficult as a result of complex licensing requirements for live 
events and vetting procedures relating to both artists and their music.  The international 
music press widely reported the July 17, 2008 announcement by the Ministry of Culture that 
the political backgrounds of all foreign performers would be checked, and those considered a 
threat to China’s sovereignty would not be granted permission to perform in China (Coonan, 
2008). 
 As China’s media sector becomes more commercially focused, opportunities for 
collaboration, cross-promotion and integration are increasing. Chinese media groups are 
adapting formats and approaches developed elsewhere in the world with high levels of 
success, shielded from foreign competition by rules preventing foreign investment in the 
broadcast media (McCullagh, 2005). In 2004 Supergirl, a Chinese equivalent of American 
Idol, earned Hunan Satellite television 68 million yuan. The Entertainment Package 
Company (yule baozhuang gongsi), which was responsible for marketing the performers and 
aggregating ancillary rights associated with the program, such as merchandising, concerts, 
and CDs, accrued 78 million yuan in revenue (Keane, 2007, p. 122). China’s own capacity to 
capture commercial opportunities associated with music is increasing as media 
commercialization becomes more entrenched.   
 While China’s domestic media industries have been developing the ability to 
make and sell content that appeals to Chinese audiences, exploring commercial 
opportunities associated with cross-platform promotion, growing mobile networks 
and access to the broadcast media, major international labels appear to have been 
caught in a negative cycle. It is extremely difficult to make money by licensing 
copyright in China and gaining access to the market is expensive and difficult, so 
Western labels have devoted few resources to promoting their products to Chinese 
audiences. Mathew Daniel, vice-president of China’s leading digital distribution 
company R2G recently summed up the problem to record industry executives 
attending the 2008 MIDEM (Music Industry) conference: 
It has to be realized that the vast majority of labels at MIDEM are probably 
currently unscathed by piracy in China and that’s likely because their music 
is so obscure in the Chinese consciousness that they have not even had the 
dubious honour of gracing the servers of China’s notorious MP3 search 
engine, Baidu. Piracy in China often gets a lot of attention but many forget 
the other Ps of marketing and these are the basics that labels intending to 
come into China should first focus on. For dramatic effect, let me … quote 
Tim O’Reilly when he said that “Obscurity is a far greater threat to authors 
and creative artists than piracy” (Daniel, 2007). 
 
Mobile distribution channels 
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According to the International Telecom Union, mobile penetration in China increased 
from just 1.9 percent in 1998 to 30.3 percent in 2005 (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2008). The Ministry of Information Industry reports that 
in February 2008 more than 56 million households had mobile access (Ministry of 
Information and Industry, 2008). The distribution of music directly to mobile devices 
by mobile operators ensures that content use can be monitored. Mobile operators’ 
established billing systems make it possible for revenue to be collected with few 
additional infrastructure or administration costs. The centralized nature of mobile 
communication networks also prevents many of the problems of unauthorized 
copying and distribution associated with the distribution of music through the Internet, 
providing an effective digital rights management solution for copyright owners. In 
China, where unauthorized networks for the distribution of physical copies of music 
are well established, independent monitoring agencies do not exist and users have 
demonstrated low levels of willingness to pay a premium for “legitimate” content, 
mobile music is emerging as one of the only large-scale points of distribution control 
and systematized revenue collection available to the market. 
 Mainland China has just two mobile operators: China Mobile and China 
Unicom (China Unicom, 2008). With more than 369 million subscribers, China 
Mobile is the biggest mobile operator in the world, and the dominant player in 
China’s mobile music market (China Mobile, 2007). The company also boasts the 
world's most extensive mobile infrastructure, which extends to all of China’s 31 
provinces (Yao, 2007). China Mobile Communications Corporation (CMCC), a state-
owned-enterprise, is China Mobile’s controlling shareholder, owning 74.33 percent of 
China Mobile Ltd. shares as of 31 December 2007 (China Mobile, 2008). In 2007, 
China mobile reported 48 million wireless music club members, 22 million of whom 
were classed as “senior members”. 31 million of China Mobile's music club members 
had joined in the previous six months – an increase of nearly 65 percent. China 
Mobile reports that “color ring revenue” has increased to 5.027 billion yuan in the 
first half of 2007, up more than 90 percent on the same period in 2006 (China Mobile, 
2007). China Unicom is significantly smaller, with “just” 142 million subscribers 
(China Unicom, 2008).  
This growth in mobile music subscribers within such a short period suggests 
that the distribution of music through mobile networks may mark a watershed 
moment for the commercial music industry. Kaiser Kuo, an original member of the 
Chinese heavy metal group Tang Dynasty, often credited with the title ‘first heavy 
metal band in China’ believes that:  
[Labels] have a very different job here. Their job now needs to be entirely 
focused on digital and they should be looking toward full song mobile 
downloads (K. Kuo, personal communication, 31 October, 2007). 
 Just as analogue technologies allowed a limited number of firms in Europe and 
the United States to control the physical production and mass distribution of music for 
much of the twentieth-century, mobile networks make it possible for a few key 
players to control distribution of music to mobile devices. In an environment where 
ownership of the copyrights associated with music have, until now, meant very little 
and domestic recording industry lobby groups have been unable to form, there is a 
very real possibility that mobile operators rather than record labels will emerge as the 
industry’s dominant stakeholders.  
 The rate at which this new distribution method is being accepted by the public 
and the lack of alternatives for controlled mass distribution and centralized revenue 
collection for music copyright owners suggest that mobile music is likely to emerge 
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as one of the most important sources of music-related income in China. As Bettig 
observes, in the context of transferable intellectual property rights, an ability to 
control the means of communication enables “capitalist classes” to extract value from 
artistic and intellectual labour: 
…to get “published”, in the broad sense, actual creators must transfer their 
rights to ownership in their work to those who have the means of 
disseminating it. With ownership of the means of communication and the 
exclusive control over the media product conferred by copyright, capitalists 
decide when and where to distribute artistic or literary works to achieve the 
highest possible return on their investments (Bettig, 1996, p. 35).  
 
It appears that in China, where mobile operators control an increasingly 
important mass distribution channels, China Mobile is on track to play such a role.  
 The development of the mobile music market in China has been led by ring-
tones and caller ring-back-tones (CRBTs). While ring-tones can be downloaded from 
a range of sources, CRBTs depend on centralized administration through a mobile 
network. Caller ring-back-tones first appeared in Korea in 2002 and have rapidly 
become one of Asia’s most popular mobile value added services. CRBT services 
allow subscribers to choose a song that callers will hear in place of the standard 
‘ringing’ tone when dialling the subscriber’s number, and are widely understood to be 
at the forefront of wireless music services, introducing subscribers to the concept of 
music delivered directly to their mobile devices.  
 Unlike ring-tones, which are generally stored on individual mobile phones, 
CRBT services are managed centrally, through mobile service providers. China 
Mobile launched China’s first CRBT service in 2003 and now provides a nation-wide 
CRBT network for all of China’s 31 provinces (Yao, 2008). By August 2006, China 
Mobile claimed to have 144 million CRBT users, with a penetration rate of 48.2 
percent (Yao, 2008). China Mobile has reported staggering growth in revenue 
generated by ring tone and CRBT services (China Mobile, 2007). The company’s 
2007 Interim Report states that color ring revenue increased by more than 90 percent 
in just 12 months, to 6.027 billion yuan (China Mobile, 2007). 
 In addition to solving many of the problems associated with unauthorized 
copying and distribution of music, mobile distribution is allowing the industry to 
access groups of consumers who were previously considered beyond reach. China’s 
mobile networks extend across China and are often available in rural areas, beyond 
the reach of music retailers, the Internet and fixed-line services. In June 2007 China 
Mobile reported that half of all new subscribers came from rural areas (China Mobile, 
2007). Ring-tones can be purchased for as little as 2 yuan (US$0.27) and CRBTs 
subscriptions for as little as 5 yuan per month (US$.69) (Daniel, 2007), making them 
popular with lower income groups who would be unlikely to purchase expensive 
legitimate copies of physical music. Top Chinese singers can sell between 10 and 20 
million CRBT subscriptions annually (Daniel, 2007). As Mathew Daniel points out 
“this is a rarefied space that is not breached by Western artists”. Chinese artists are 
responsible for the vast majority of revenue being generated through mobile music 
(Daniel, 2007). 
 Given the power of Chinese mobile operators to control distribution channels 
and revenue collection, it is unsurprising that the vast majority of money generated 
through mobile music in China stays with the mobile operator. Service providers, 
distributors, labels and music publishers share an initial “sign-up fee” when a 
subscriber first signs on to a CRBT package.  After the initial sign-up fee has been 
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divided between these parties, subsequent full monthly subscription fees are kept 
solely by China Mobile (Daniel, 2007).   
 While there are signs that the role of record labels in China will be very 
different from their role in other markets, Terry Tang, Director of China Business 
Development at Noank Media (also known as Fei Liu Internet Technologies) suggests 
that they will not disappear from the market completely. While mobile music is 
quickly becoming the most important source of revenue in the industry, there is still a 
place for live music and artist management. Labels are in a position to connect artists 
with mobile operators, manage advertising deals and to ensure that publishing and 
performance licences are obtained – all key components of the music business in 
today’s China (T. Tang, personal communication, 2 November, 2007). 
 The appearance of an accessible mass market for commercially produced 
music is prompting increased concentration and coordination of production activities 
among domestic operators. Although there have been some amazing stories of 
amateur musicians who have produced a hit ring-tone from their bedroom and made 
millions, commercial spaces are quickly being filled by large, vertically integrated 
content providers. Hurray is one such company. In addition to providing mobile 
operators with the software applications designed to manage the delivery of mobile 
content services, Hurray has purchased record labels and artist management 
companies such as New Run (Birdman) and Huayi Brothers Music (Hurray, 2008) 
and secured a partnership agreement with MTV China (ChinaTechNews.com, 2006). 
The continued significance of book numbers, a legacy of the censorship system, may 
also add to the concentration of power within the market of a few key players. It is 
interesting to note Hurray’s purchase of Huayi Bros. Music, one of China’s few 
record labels with a licence to issue its own book numbers. This suggests that Hurray 
has recognized the strategic advantage associated with the ability to issue these 
licences in an environment of growing demand for content. 
 
Conclusion 
Although much of the scholarly discussion of censorship in China has focused on its 
use in controlling the ideological nature of content, little attention has been paid to its 
role in protecting China’s developing domestic creative and cultural industries from 
foreign competition. In the case of the music industry, it appears that cultural policies 
that make it harder to publish foreign content, strict regulations governing foreign 
investment in content industries, and low levels of copyright enforcement have 
worked together to provide Chinese media businesses with space to develop 
effectively. Although groups such as the International Federation of Phonographic 
Industries have focused heavily on the need to increase levels of copyright protection 
to ensure commercial developments in China’s music industry, the success of new 
music distribution technologies and a growing capacity to provide local content in 
forms that satisfy the demands of local consumers, in spite of very high levels of 
unauthorized  copying and distribution of physical media, suggests that copyright has 
not been the key impediment to the success of international artists and labels in the 
Chinese market.  
 Formal accession to international copyright treaties, combined with low levels 
of enforcement and market protection in the form of censorship and media investment 
regulations have ensured that China has secured many of the benefits of international 
trade, without exposing its domestic creative and cultural industries to the rigors of 
fully-fledged international competition. Rather than falling victim to globally 
dominant exporters of intellectual property, China’s domestic music industry is 
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successfully developing a market for local content, alongside its own capacity to 
provide the content and services demanded by Chinese consumers. This approach fits 
comfortably with Ha-Joon Chang’s (2008) observations about the potential for 
government intervention to ensure the success of infant industries in developing 
economies.  
 However, restrictive cultural policies are not entirely responsible for the 
failure of major international record labels to capture a major share of the market in 
China. Unwillingness to adapt to an environment where ownership of intellectual 
property rights cannot guarantee control over how music is used and distributed, and 
reluctance to explore alternative approaches to music distribution and licensing have 
also contributed to their lack of success. There are signs that China’s domestic music 
industry has been able to turn high rates of unauthorized copying and distribution to 
its advantage, pursuing business strategies capable of succeeding in the context of a 
weak copyright system and gradually adopting rights licensing systems as the industry 
becomes better organized – for example, in the licensing of rights to the mobile 
distribution of music and in the apportionment of rights associated with the Supergirl 
series. 
 The importance of access to a means of controlling the distribution of content 
and organizing the collection of revenue on a mass scale in spurring large-scale 
commercial activity within in the music industry seems equally obvious. The 
appearance of mobile music distribution networks in China has been associated with a 
rapid increase in levels of commercial investment and organization. The apparent 
association between this distribution bottleneck and the growth of an organized, 
profitable commercial music industry in China highlights the continuing role of 
monopoly structures in the commercialization of culture in a digital age. It is possible 
that the distribution of music through mobile networks will allow just one or two 
mobile operators to control access to one of the market’s few controllable distribution 
and revenue-collection channels – an even higher level of concentration than the 
handful of major international labels who have dominated the global recorded music 
industry.  
 It is tempting to believe that the Chinese government’s concern with 
controlling culture is fading and that new technologies are resulting in greater 
freedom for producers and consumers of cultural and entertainment products. 
However, the potential for the Chinese government to exert its influence in shaping 
the cultural fabric of an emerging, highly centralized commercial music industry 
should not be forgotten. Baranovitch (2003) has argued that limiting access to 
economic opportunities for musicians played an important role in the government’s 
control of culture and entertainment in an increasingly commercial environment 
throughout the 1990s. The continued existence of the publishing license system and 
the advent of a single network for the most lucrative form of mass distribution of 
music in China, in which the government remains the dominant stakeholder, suggests 
very strongly that the Chinese government remains interested in the power associated 
with popular culture and is developing methods of exerting its influence in the context 
of a market-driven economy.  
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 For convenience, in this paper, “West” is used as shorthand for democratic liberal market economies 
such as exist in Western Europe, the United States and Australia. 
2 The International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) 2006 Piracy Report claimed that rates 
of “physical piracy” in China were 85 percent. The total value of the legitimate physical music market 
was calculated at US$120 million, while the value of physical piracy was reported to be US$410 
million (IFPI, 2006). However, when music industry professionals interviewed by the author in Beijing 
in 2005 were asked to estimate levels of unauthorized copying and distribution of physical music 
products, estimates were as high as 95 percent. 
3 In October 2001 the PRC government amended China’s copyright law in preparation for accession to 
the World Trade Organization. The copyright amendments attempted to bring the law into line with the 
WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. The amended law provides 
copyright owners with recourse against infringement through administrative channels, court 
proceedings or a combination of these options.  A more detailed discussion of the role of the amended 
copyright law in the PRC’s film and music industries can be found in Montgomery & Fitzgerald (2005). 
4 In 2008 it has been reported that Google are expected to announce a joint venture with top100.cn that 
would allow users to download licensed music reports for free (Google to enter, 2008). 
